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goals of conservation, they will need to clearly state their positions
and avoid confusing criticism of those positions with judgments
about their personal morality. They can’t reasonably complain that
Primack and I have misinterpreted their views, when their stated
views contradict one another. In one essay to which our editorial
(Cafaro and Primack, 2014) responded, they describe efforts to
reintroduce extirpated native species, such as wolves, as misplaced
‘‘nostalgia’’ for ‘‘the world as it once was,’’ glibly justify humanity’s
incipient extinction of polar bears as a function of a ‘‘changing
environment,’’ and suggest that nonhuman species should be
sacriﬁced if that will beneﬁt people economically (Kareiva et al.,
2011). Yet now they say that they ‘‘believe unequivocally
that human-caused extinction is a moral wrong’’ (Marvier and
Kareiva, 2014). This is incoherent.
Calling an action morally wrong means upholding the principle
that people should avoid doing it. It is not a matter of expressing
particularly strong feelings, as Marvier and Kareiva (2014) errone-
ously suggests. Calling anthropogenic extinction a moral wrong
means afﬁrming that when people’s economic activities threaten
to extinguish another species, we should modify or cease those
activities (Rolston, 1989). Kareiva and Marvier nowhere clearly
afﬁrm such a principle. Instead, their original essays (Kareiva
et al., 2011; Kareiva and Marvier, 2012) advise conservationists
to work with corporations to promote economic growth, a leading
cause of biodiversity loss, and to embrace an ‘‘Anthropocene
Epoch’’ in which humanity bends nature ever more fully to our
will. It does not appear possible to square this approach to
conservation with a serious moral commitment to prevent species
extinctions. This is suggested, for example, by the fact that they
disparage parks and protected areas for violating people’s
economic rights (Kareiva and Marvier, 2012), while neglecting tomention their irreplaceable role in securing other species’ right
to continued existence. Their original papers also made numerous
bogus empirical claims that are not supported by the scientiﬁc
literature (Doak et al., 2014)—yet another indication of a cavalier
attitude toward threatened and endangered species.
Marvier and Kareiva’s (2014) new letter combines useful,
well-established points (e.g. the potential value of creating broad
coalitions to protect biodiversity) with misleading ones
(e.g. saddling those and only those who afﬁrm biodiversity’s intrin-
sic value with a vague and objectionable ‘‘moral certitude’’). I
remain skeptical of their overall approach to conservation, as
deﬁned by the entirety of their writings. If conservationists hope
to keep the Anthropocene epoch from devolving into the Homo-
genocene (the age of dullness) or the Thanatocene (the age of
death), we will need to advocate for strong, society-wide moral
and legal commitments aimed at preventing the extinction of
other species.
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